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POLITICS AND CULTURE IN YUGOSLAVIA

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The University of Michigan

Ann Arbor: Center for Political Studies
Institute for Social Research
The University of Michigan
1987

Political Analysis: Cultural Dimensions
U.S. Department of State Contract 1724-520100

Politics and Culture Series
Series Editor
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PREFACE

Politics and Culture in Yugoslavia is the seventh monograph in the series on the analysis of culture and politics in a variety of national settings. The series is designed to further understanding of how culture helps shape political systems and behavior in selected countries. The monographs should be useful to analysts, diplomats, and others with extensive knowledge of the particular country as well as to those seeking an introduction.

The Department of State selected the countries to be included in the series. As series editor, I chose the authors of individual monographs and prepared a set of guidelines developed in two conferences organized by the Office of Long-Range Assessments and Research at State and attended by government and academic specialists. The guidelines reflect my perspective on "Culture and Politics" as presented in a monograph with that title prepared as part of the project. That general work is available to those seeking more background on the topic.

Each country monograph was revised following a review session attended by academic and government specialists on the country. However, the country author bears final responsibility for the contents of the volume; it should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the Department of State.

The country author also prepared the references and the annotated bibliography of the most important interpretations of culture and politics in the country. For statistical and other basic information on the country, readers should consult the latest issue of *Background Notes*, issued by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State.

I am indebted to many people for the success of this series. Dr. E. Raymond Platig, Director of the Office of Long-Range Assessments and Research at the Department, heads the list. This collaboration between government and the academy has been facilitated and enriched by his understanding of both cultures. He joins me in expressing appreciation to the many participants in our conferences on the conceptual monograph and on individual countries. Their collective experience is formidable. Their insights, criticisms, and advice have been invaluable.

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HIGHLIGHTS

There are several major features of the links between culture and politics in contemporary Yugoslavia. First, the attitudes of key age cohorts of the Yugoslav population have been differentially influenced by the enormous demographic, societal, and political changes in Yugoslavia that have occurred over the last forty years. As a result, intergenerational differences are a key basis for distinctions in attitude and behavior among elites and publics in contemporary Yugoslavia. In attitudes toward change, toward relations between men and women, or in their primary political attachments, the young differ from both the middle and older generations.

Second, occupational and class differences constitute a horizontal fault that reinforces the inter-generational differences in mass and elite attitudes. Peasants and those who were recently peasants often are quite distinct attitudinally from others.

Third, the enormous legacy of the past on contemporary options for the evolution of Yugoslav politics bears emphasizing. Significant constraints imposed by Croat, Serb, and Albanian memories of recent experiences as well as of prior experiences stretching back hundreds of years influence likely political outcomes.

Fourth, active participation in institutions, whether the Yugoslav League of Communists, the armed forces, or the Catholic church, is a major marker in distinguishing attitudes of elites and publics, especially concerning the nature of their primary attachments.

Fifth, a major salient feature of Yugoslav culture and politics is that most major cleavages overlap rather than crosscut. A fault line depicting major regional differences would run in a more or less northwest to southeast direction and would sort out people in politically important ways by religion, by language, by ethnicity, by historical experience, and by levels of affluence and modernity. Traditionally this reality has led observers to regard the distinctions between being a Croat and a Serb as the crucial ones in identifying the politically relevant cleavages. Today, however, the locus of major tension is between the ethnic Albanians largely located in Kosovo and the Serbs and other Slavs. The cleavages in this instance are especially sharp. In addition to all the obvious and acute differences between Albanians and Serbs, there is the enormous symbolic issue of the legal and constitutional status of Kosovo, currently an autonomous region, an anomalous arrangement that epitomizes the issue of whether only South Slavs are to be equal participants in the political system.

INTRODUCTION

As a way of introducing an essay on culture and politics in Yugoslavia consider three unrelated particularities: one a tale about a father, his brothers and his son; the second an anecdote; the third, a prediction. The tale about a father, his brothers and his son pertains to a distinguished Croatian academic about fifty years old. His life style would be instantly recognizable to contemporary American academics and professionals. He has a wife and two children, and (the last time we saw each other) a Volkswagen. He works all the time and would not have it any other way. He travels regularly: I once tried to see him and was told he was going to be in Paris on Monday, Berlin on Tuesday and Belgrade on Friday. He himself is one of five brothers.

The other four brothers are Dalmatian fishermen. They live as their father and their father's father before them did: they sit in a *kafana*¹ and drink wine and talk until they run out of money. When this occurs, they go into the Adriatic to fish until they have enough money to sit in the *kafana* and drink wine and talk until they run out of money. When this occurs....

The academic's son has lived a lifestyle, until recently at least, that is rather like that of many young adults in the United States and Western Europe: unlike his traditionalist uncles or his career oriented father, his values and his life style are distinctively post-materialist and vaguely new left: work for him has little meaning in itself and he is mostly concerned about a deteriorating environment. He shares only one belief in common with his uncles--that his father, their brother, is crazy.

The anecdote also relates to a Yugoslav academic, in this instance a Serb who teaches political science at the University of Belgrade. We were sitting one evening in a restaurant outside of Belgrade that overlooks the Danube. "There!" he said--pointing in the direction of Vojvodina, "On the other side of the river: Europe."

The prediction concerns the likelihood of recurring inter-ethnic clashes between Croats and Serbs or Serbs and Albanians in the late 1980s and early 1990s sufficient in their severity to warrant coverage by *The New York Times*. Moreover, in any given year when these disturbances occur, they will most probably take place in late June, on or about the 28th.

Each of these, the two vignettes and the hypothetical major episodes, are illustrative of larger patterns that point to the significance of an understanding of the links between culture and politics to an appropriate understanding of the dynamics of Yugoslav political evolution. (By culture I have in mind Samuel Barnes' concept of culture as "shared assumptions of a group" [1986, p.4] and Almond and Powell's "attitudes, beliefs, values and skills which are current in an entire population" or among "separate parts of that population" that *bear* on politics rather than the

latter's more narrow definition of political culture as "orientations toward politics") (Almond and Powell, 1965, pp. 23, 50).

These particularities do not capture all the salient features of culture and politics but they identify several of the most significant ones. Thus, the academic, his brothers, and his son epitomize the attitudes of key age cohorts of the Yugoslav population that have been differentially influenced by the enormous demographic, societal, and political changes in Yugoslavia that have occurred over the last fifty years. Intergenerational differences are a key basis for distinctions in attitude and behavior among elites and publics in contemporary Yugoslavia.

The anecdote about the Serbian academic reflects one central politically relevant cultural cleavage in communist Yugoslavia, though probably no longer the only one. My Serbian friend was drawing attention in a light-hearted and self-effacing manner to the different cultural inheritance of those whose forefathers over most of the five hundred years before World War I lived under Austro-Hungarian rule and hence think of themselves, and are thought of by others, as Europeans,² and those whose pasts have been shaped by nearly as lengthy a period of Ottoman influence. The former, if they are religious, are overwhelmingly Catholic and use the Latin script, whether they speak Slovenian or the Western variant of Serbo-Croatian. The latter, if they are religious, are Orthodox or in some instances Moslem, and those who speak Serbo-Croatian will generally write in Cyrillic. While the dialect each Serbo-Croatian speaker uses differs as little as do English and American English, they are sufficiently distinctive so that the person's geographic origins and cultural baggage will be immediately apparent. A second major salient feature of Yugoslav culture and politics is that most major cleavages are overlapping rather than cross-cutting. A fault line depicting major regional differences would run in a more or less northwest to southeast direction and would sort out people in politically important ways by region, by ethnicity, by religion, by historical experience, and by levels of affluence and modernity.

The prediction flows from two historical events. In 1089 King Zvonimir of Croatia died. With the sleazy exception of the Independent State of Croatia proclaimed two days after the Germans occupied Zagreb in 1941, Croatia has not been independent since. Croatian nationalists may well use the nine hundredth anniversary of the loss of Croatian independence to mobilize support for increased autonomy for Croatia.

In 1389 the Serbs faced and were defeated by the Turks at Kosovo Polje. The sense that Kosovo Polje is the emotional center of Serbia still remains six hundred years after Prince Lazar's defeat by the Turkish Sultan. Largely as a result of oral epic poems, the defeat at Kosovo field has symbolized the glory that was Serbia. As such it is commemorated annually on June 28 by Serbs as Vidovdan. While it is the emotional center of Serbia, Kosovo Polje is no longer situated among a population that is largely Serbian ethnically. Rather it is located in the Socialist Autonomous Region of Kosovo which, while legally a part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, is overwhelmingly Albanian ethnically. Kosovo is a place where increasingly Serbs and other Slavs, most notably Montenegrins, perceive themselves as unwelcome.

Six hundred years after the Serbian defeat at Kosovo Polje, the attachment to Kosovo remains. Consequently, there will continue to be demonstrations into the 1990s by Serbs opposed to their displacement from Kosovo. In any particular year, we can safely assert that the most likely timing for such an episode would be on or about June 28. It would scarcely be the first time in this century that June 28 was a major news day in the Balkans. Aside from being the day the constitution establishing the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was adopted in 1921, it was also on that day in 1914 the Archduke Ferdinand was shot in Sarajevo and the day in 1948 the Cominform resolution reading Tito's Yugoslavia out of the communist movement was issued. A third salient feature of contemporary culture and politics in Yugoslavia is the enormous legacy of the past and in particular the constraints imposed on likely political outcomes by Croat, Serb, and Albanian memories of historically recent events including events in the "first" Yugoslavia in the years between World Wars I and II, World War II and the early period of communist rule as well as of prior experiences stretching back hundreds of years.

What these real and hypothetical examples do not symbolize is two other major cleavages that must be part of a survey of important determinants of culture and politics in contemporary Yugoslavia. In describing the father and his traditional brothers, there was a hint, but only that, of a fourth major proposition about the culturally defined bases of political behavior: namely, that occupational and class differences constitute a horizontal fault that reinforces the inter-generational differences in mass and elite attitudes. Finally, none of these episodes introduces the reader to a fifth salient feature of contemporary Yugoslav culture and politics. I refer to the importance that active participation in key institutions, whether the Yugoslav League of Communists (YCL), the armed forces, or the Catholic church, has on the attitudes of elites and publics, especially concerning the nature of their primary attachments.

The purpose of this essay is to elaborate further on these salient determinants of Yugoslav culture and politics in a way that will enable the reader to imbed small episodes and a putative major event, such as those with which this paper began, onto a broader and richer understanding of the impact of culture on the political behavior of Yugoslav elites and publics.

In particular, we are concerned with four sets of key questions involving links between culture and politics. Of these, the first set remains the most crucial both for scholars and for policy analysts.

What holds Yugoslavia together? An essay on culture and politics in Yugoslavia can not provide all the answers to that question. What it can illuminate, however, is the likelihood and intensity of conflict, the changing rules of the game, the changing bases and intensity of support for the system and the regime, and the changing bases of support for Yugoslav domestic and foreign policies. For example, are the domestic factors which contribute to or impede attachment to Yugoslavia as a state changing as basic demographic and societal transformations occur? Has modernization brought about greater attachment to the Yugoslav state at the expense of more parochial as well as more universal attachments? Is

Yugoslavia, instead, a state where in the contemporary world loyalty to institutions associated with more parochial cultures has increased as the country as a whole has developed and become more modern by most indicators?

How are demographic and societal changes affecting the nature of politics and the distribution of attitudes among elites and publics in Yugoslavia? What are the rules of the game of Yugoslav politics and how for instance are they being changed by the shifts in proportions among the nationalities, especially the enormous increase in the number of Albanians and Moslems both absolutely and as a proportion of the overall population? (Those who identified themselves as Albanian in the 1948 census represented 4.8% of the population and those who were ethnically Moslem--mostly Bosnian Slavs who are religiously Moslem--amounted to 5.1%. In the most recent, 1981, census they are 7.7% and 8.9% of the total population, respectively.)

How has the enormous growth in the number and proportions of university graduates affected links between political and other elite subcultures? In what ways and along what dimensions are there culturally grounded differences in the attitudes of mass and attentive publics? How do the attitudes of mass and attentive publics translate into politically relevant attitudes, given the nature of the Yugoslav communist system?

Are the political institutions as they have evolved both under Tito and subsequent to his death that are largely a product of a communist elite political culture adequate for governance in as culturally diverse a country as Yugoslavia? Is the load that the political system must accommodate increasing or decreasing as fundamental societal and demographic changes transform the publics which the elites must govern?

MAPPING YUGOSLAV CULTURE

In dealing with Yugoslavia we are concerned with an enormously heterogeneous society. One can, however, provide a kind of cultural map that renders much of what takes place politically in Yugoslavia fairly intelligible (see Appendix).

One initial point to bear in mind is that the effective boundaries of Yugoslavia and the juridical boundaries of the state are not the same. Any treatment of key attitudinal differences needs to acknowledge that at any given time over the last fifteen years roughly a million Yugoslavs were living abroad either as workers or as members of a worker's household and were, in the process, being socialized in an environment that is capitalist and pluralist. Broadly speaking, these people probably come out of that experience somewhat more disposed to identify with Yugoslavia symbolically, but they have also had experiences which are alien both to the agrarian cultural traditions out of which many of them have come and to an elite political culture in which private ownership and private enterprise remain suspect, despite declared policies favoring small scale private enterprise (*mala privreda*).

Other major aspects of a mapping of Yugoslav subcultures were prefigured by the introduction. It is nevertheless useful to emphasize some central points. For one thing, secularization has diminished the independent role of religion in Yugoslav life, especially in the more developed regions. For most Yugoslav believers, participation does not mark them off distinctively in terms of attitudes toward such Yugoslav policies as self-management. The church is in that sense a partial, not a total, institution. What religion does do though is to serve as a symbol that becomes interwoven with ethnic identity. As an integral part of ethnic identity, moreover, religion plays a substantial role in shaping basic political attachments.

This is largely because religion or religious heritage, language, and ethnicity strongly co-vary. Knowing that someone is a Slovene, a Serb, a Croat, an Albanian, or a Macedonian is generally not only to learn someone's ethnicity but also his native language and his religious background. (A partial exception to this norm are the Bosnians, if that term is thought to refer to a national group. A Bosnian might be Catholic, Orthodox, or Moslem religiously and might speak either the eastern or western variant of Serbo-Croatian.)

Moreover, a mapping of economic development and historically relevant experience would produce much the same cleavages. A minimalist mapping of language patterns would distinguish four major areas: one where Slovenian dominates--obviously in Slovenia; a second where some variant of Serbo-Croatian is the main tongue--Serbia, the Vojvodina (where there is also a large Hungarian minority), Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro; Macedonian--Macedonia; Albanian (unlike the others, not even a Slavic language)--Kosovo.

Almost the same pattern would obtain if one were to describe the pattern of historically relevant experiences. The Slovenes and to a lesser extent the Croats manifest carryovers of their Austro-Hungarian experience. Persons from the southern regions still reveal values and expectations that flow from the warrior-herdsman traditions and the experience with the patron-client patterns of the Ottoman empire. An example might reinforce the point. There is usually some empirical basis to ethnic stereotypes. In the Verba-Nie-Kim seven nation study, respondents were asked to state what was the first duty of a citizen to the state. The first and second most frequent responses given by persons from Slovenia were "work" and "obey laws" with "national defense" a distant fourth. Far and away the first response of the respondents from Macedonia was "national defense" (ICPSR, 1978).

An overlay of regional economic distinctions would also produce much the same map. The economic placement of Slovenia by virtually all measures of development would be at about twice the Yugoslav mean with the other Slavic speaking regions ranging from about a quarter above the mean in the case of Croatia and Vojvodina to about a quarter or perhaps a third below the mean for Montenegro and Macedonia. At about a third the mean for the country, Kosovo would be far from the other Yugoslav regions on a map measuring economic development just as it would on a map charting linguistic boundaries. Taken together, there are many things that separate Albanians from South Slavs: the

differential demographic growth rates; the constitutional legal distinction between Kosovo and Vojvodina (which are Socialist Autonomous Regions within the Socialist Republic of Serbia, not republics) and the six republics; the gap between the level of economic development in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia; and the linguistic (ethnic, religious) differences. The problem of Kosovo is going to be a preeminent one for the policy relevant future.

Institutional culture

The central political institution in Yugoslavia remains the YCL despite the enormous devolution of power to the regional party organs. Participation, and especially active participation, in the YCL constitutes an important contour line in mapping attitudes. It comes much closer in this respect to being a total institution than do religious institutions in Yugoslavia.

Other institutions are relevant subcultures as well. The Federation of Veterans [of World War II] has articulated views for a long time that seem shaped by the World War II experience. For them "unity and brotherhood" are not symbols of derision as they are for substantial numbers of the young but rather evocative of a time when the YCL had goals that transcended holding together a heterodox coalition.

The army itself has also long been seen as epitomizing a view of national cohesion which is intolerant of devolving power to keep peace in the family. As a total institution and as the ultimate guarantor of national cohesion, this view is probably correct, though I am not aware of much empirical data to support the proposition. What is usually not said is that the army is an institution that has many of the attributes of other Yugoslav institutions, the consequence being that its membership has been socialized into accepting some basic norms such as some form of self-management for the civilian realm and some variant on non-alignment. At the same time, one gets much the same impression of people living in different worlds when one compares the difference in cultures of youth groups especially in Slovenia and army leaders³ as when one compares the views of Slovenes and Kosovars.

INTERPRETATIONS OF CULTURE AND POLITICS IN YUGOSLAVIA

There are some ready pitfalls to avoid in interpreting culture and politics in Yugoslavia. One is the propensity for overdetermination. Consider the central question, What holds Yugoslavia together? Some essential elements of an answer to that question are not to be found in an essay on culture and politics. Yugoslavia exists in an international environment as well as a domestic one and its location in the international environment makes a difference (Zimmerman, 1987). Thus, in the atomic era under conditions of strategic bi-polarity, states, once formed, generally persist and their existing boundaries rarely change regardless of internal societal and cultural cleavages.

Moreover, without the Stalin-Tito break in 1948, one might well have witnessed a far different relationship between culture and politics than we have in fact witnessed over almost the past forty years. There are, as Ross Johnson (1972) has shown, some Yugoslav elements in Yugoslav communism that antecede Stalin's break with Tito. Nevertheless, it remains true that, having largely emulated the Soviet model in seizing power, the Yugoslav communists set out to impose on Yugoslav society their, generally quite correct, understanding of the Soviet model. Like the Bolsheviks, the Yugoslavs came to power more or less on their own; they created a monolithic party organization headed by a charismatic leader; and they set out immediately to transform Yugoslav society through such characteristically Soviet means as nationalization and expropriation. Moreover, they patterned the economy after that of the Soviet Union. This involved the introduction of a command economy, forced savings and deferred gratification, five-year plans, full employment, state foreign trade monopoly, bilateral trade flows, and autarky. That model in its Stalinist variant has been aptly characterized as the revenge of the superstructure.

Even without the Soviet-Yugoslav split, we would still need to explain how it came to pass that Yugoslav communists internalized the beliefs and cognitions that were central to Soviet elite political culture under Stalin and why millions of Yugoslavs, communist and otherwise, supported the partisans during the Second World War. Nevertheless, had the Soviet-Yugoslav split not occurred, the central part of the story of culture and politics in Yugoslavia for much of the period of communist rule would have involved understanding the beliefs and cognitions that are central to Soviet elite more than Yugoslav political culture.

But the split occurred. And its occurrence provided a context which obliged Yugoslav elites to rethink the relationship of the state to both the international system and to society. Those conscious choices in turn set in process events and institutional changes which resulted in a far more interactive relationship between regime and society, politics and culture, superstructure and base.

What needs to be avoided in such circumstances are rather simple interpretations of the effects of culture on Yugoslav politics. One such version tells the story of the history of the lands which came to make up what is today Yugoslavia as a struggle between two traditional cultures, a peasant culture of the lowlands and an upland culture where herding was key. Roles in each were sharply defined and males were dominant.

In the former, the peasant cooperative or *zadruga* provided an environment in which violence was abhorred, and where despite the elaborate hierarchy of relationships--Yugoslavs have specific words for particular relatives analogous to the proliferation of words for types of snow in Eskimo--a rough and ready egalitarianism and indifference to power obtained. The Dinaric, or mountain, culture by contrast was one where the warrior was celebrated and where authoritarian mores were glorified, where deceit and mistrust were routine, and where power-seeking was a matter of course.

One interpretation (Tomasic, 1948) views the history of the South Slavs (Yugoslavia meaning the land of the South Slavs) as being a many times told story of the domination of persons from the *zadruga* culture by warriors from the more militarily oriented Dinaric cultures. "At the end of World War II, the Dinaric warriors organized as Partisan guerrillas imposed themselves again upon the Zadruga peasantry.... This process of formation of the Partisan Republic [post-war Yugoslavia], was the reenactment of a drama that has so often taken place in the course of two thousand years' history" (Tomasic, 1948, p. 204). There certainly is no question that the warrior and the obligation to defend the state are held in greater esteem in what is today the south of Yugoslavia than elsewhere in Yugoslavia but Dinko Tomasic was forcing matters into a Procrustean bed even in the 1940s when 67% of the working population were still engaged in agriculture. Such an interpretation is far less plausible in contemporary Yugoslavia when, according to the 1981 census, only a fifth of the population (20%) work in agriculture (*Statistički Godisnjak Jugoslavije*, [SGJ] 1986, p. 119).⁴ The reality of traditional life was considerably more complex and conflictual than often depicted (Rihtman-Augustin, 1984) and the causal chain that links traditional cultures or more accurately myths about traditional cultures to group behavior patterns in modern industrial society is often, as in this instance, quite intricate.

An inattention to the impact of Yugoslav experience and culture on the evolution of Yugoslav elite beliefs would result in overstating the correspondence between Yugoslav and Soviet political institutions and behavior. In like fashion, a too ready equation of authoritarianism with traditional Balkan mentality, or life under the Ottomans, or the impact of Dinaric culture, could lead to facile and sometimes flatly wrong presumptions. It would be quite wrong for instance to assume that in the disputes between the Croatian and Serbian republic party leaderships in the late 1980s the former, as Europeans, are more liberal. As many including Milovan Djilas have noted, the Croatian communist party leadership was among the most authoritarian in the late 1980s whereas liberalism was rife in Serbia, especially in Belgrade.

GENERAL CULTURAL PATTERNS

The nearest parallel to the Yugoslav cultural mosaic in the contemporary world is probably Lebanon. Consequently, an entirely reasonable question to ask is whether it makes any sense to talk about the underlying informal beliefs, what social anthropologists term the implicit (in contradistinction to explicit) culture of a society as culturally heterogeneous as Yugoslavia. What seems indisputable is that if we are to speak of general cultural norms, two elements would be included in any such list. One is egalitarianism, the other consumerism or materialism.

Egalitarianism and consumerism

On the issue of egalitarianism I take the lead of the Yugoslav sociologist, Josip Zupanov (1969 and 1983), whose important research on the dynamics of self-management has contributed importantly to the study of social interactions and the role of culture in determining politically relevant behavior in Yugoslavia. There is a

sense in which both the United States and Yugoslavia are egalitarian societies. In both instances, egalitarianism does not preclude socio-economic differentiation. The two concepts diverge, however, in that one pertains primarily to process and the other primarily to substance. The American notion of equality relates primarily to the notion of opportunity with respect to the process of distributing political and economic goods. Such a conception has the effect of legitimating social stratification if it is an outcome of equal opportunity. "In Yugoslavia, the prevailing concept is that social equality demands the equal distribution of material goods among all members of society; that is, aiming against social stratification (especially economic and occupationally based stratification)" (Zupanov, 1969, p. 273).

These norms persist despite explicitly disparaging attacks on egalitarian impulses by persons at all levels of the political system and in a wide range of societal roles. Since the 1960s, when the first major economic reforms were adopted, the explicit culture has been one in which such impulses are scornfully depicted as *uravnilovka*--leveling--(with its pejorative implication of pro-Soviet sympathies),⁵ "the theory of equally empty stomachs" (Zupanov, 1969, p. 299) or "communal kitchen socialism," another anti-Soviet dig. Doubtless this occurs partly because there are powerful social and political forces in Yugoslavia that are particularly committed to egalitarianism as a norm. In part, however, it persists because it is truly rooted in the culture for a wide variety of reasons, some of which relate to what Yugoslavs often characterize as "primitive" attitudes characteristic of pre-industrial society, some doubtless because this dimension of the official ideology strikes a resonant chord. In any event, it is a widespread cultural norm found among persons at all levels of the economic spectrum that has ramifications both for everyday life in Yugoslavia and for the ability to bring about political change.

If egalitarianism is widespread, consumerism is virtually ubiquitous. Consumerism permeates Yugoslav society except in a diminishing number of truly traditional and isolated communities and in Slovenia and Croatia where some, especially the young, have assimilated attitudes more akin to post-materialism. In part this is a natural result of the rapid economic growth that has characterized Yugoslavia for virtually the entire post-World War II period until the early 1980s. Consumerism and materialism have typically been the norms of societies everywhere that have undergone the rush to modernity with anything like the pace which Yugoslavia experienced in the thirty years 1950-1980. In addition, the Yugoslav political elite was the first communist leadership to abandon the doctrinal commitment to deferred gratification and to encourage instead the notion that the citizen's material improvement was a direct outcome of communist rule. Moreover, the opening of the country's borders to the inflow of tourism and the outflow of Yugoslav guestworkers to Europe and elsewhere provided ample opportunity for Yugoslavs to acquire the notion that the acquisition of things was desirable, either on their merits or as a form of conspicuous consumption.

Whatever the source of these attitudes, Yugoslavs have internalized them with a vengeance. The spread of radio and, more recently, television sets is

instructive. From approximately 600,000 radios in Yugoslavia in 1955, the number quadrupled over the next decade and then increased to approximately 3.6 million in 1975 and to more than 4.7 million sets by 1985. First figures for television sets are reported in 1960 when there were 30,000 sets, none of which were in Montenegro, Macedonia, or Kosovo. A decade later in 1970, the number for the country as a whole had increased to almost 1.7 million sets and television was available throughout the country. Five years later the number of sets had increased by an additional million. By 1985 there were more than 4 million television sets in Yugoslavia or one for every five Yugoslavs.

The same pattern may be discerned with respect to automobiles. It is not just Americans who have love affairs with their cars and their vacation homes. In 1955, there were fewer than 13,000 automobiles in Yugoslavia. A decade later in 1965 that number had increased more than tenfold to 188,000. By 1975 the number of passenger cars exceeded 1,500,000 and by 1985 more than 2,800,000 cars, or approximately one car for every seven Yugoslavs, were registered in Yugoslavia (SGJ, 1986, p. 315). Yugoslavs owned 43,000 vacation homes [*vikenditsa*] in 1971 and 335,000 in 1981. If, as Ogburn first observed, technology is the material culture of a society, then the numbers and dissemination of cars, radios, and television sets represent contemporary artifacts that are manifest expressions of the values of contemporary Yugoslav culture. In the 1950s, it was simply beyond the aspirations of millions of Yugoslavs to have a car, a television set, or a washing machine. A quarter of a century later, shortages of gasoline and detergent constituted major irritants to many and were taken by many Yugoslavs as evidence of the regime's inability to perform.

Inter-personal trust and openness

The notion that one may speak meaningfully of a single Yugoslav culture is even more contentious along other key dimensions than with respect to egalitarianism and consumerism or materialism. In these domains, the enormous heterogeneity of the society comes quickly into play, even though one should not lose sight of the effects which forty years of communist rule have had on the beliefs of all segments of the society. The very diversity of the society becomes an explanation of key patterns of social distance, of inter-personal trust, of attitudes toward the future and toward authority structures in daily life. To the extent therefore that what follows in the remainder of this section speaks of Yugoslav (undifferentiated) cultural patterns, the reader is urged to remember that these are at most patterns and subject to considerable qualification.

With respect to inter-personal trust, for instance, the sense of difference, with its implied or real implications of social distance, has direct consequences both for plain folk and politicians. Traditional mountain and rural social structures provided strong incentives for extremely close bonds within the clan. These cultural patterns carry over in urban settings in, for instance, Sarajevo or Belgrade where the role of the godfather (*kum*) continues to be important. At the same time, such lack of trust as exists has a basis in the traditional social structures of rural society. For centuries peasants in the Balkans have been acculturated through epic poems and folk sayings

to suspect and fear abstract and even mythical Turks and Vlahs. (A good friend, herself originally a Serbian peasant but with a degree in cultural anthropology from Brandeis, tells me how surprised she was the first time she visited Istanbul. She was astonished at how prepared she had been, on the basis of her childhood socialization experiences, to believe that Turks were giants and monsters who routinely slaughtered babies.) Thus, in one recent survey published by the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb (*NIN*, May 4, 1986, p. 10) about three-eighths (38%) of those peasants surveyed agreed and one-half (50%) disagreed with the proposition that "A person can feel himself completely secure only when he lives in an environment where the majority belong to his nation."

Those who have lived in urban settings by contrast are more accustomed to social interactions between persons of differing cultural heritages and seem in general less distressed by such experiences. Among those in the survey who were not peasants, the next most ethnocentrically disposed were unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Most of these workers almost certainly either had been peasants or were originally from villages: of them 29% agreed and 65% disagreed with the proposition that equated security with living in a milieu where the majority are members of the same "nation." Those who were privately employed or were skilled workers were more secure in heterogeneous environments than were either the peasants or the unskilled workers. Among these two groups only about a fifth (21% and 23% respectively) agreed that one could only feel completely secure in a milieu composed largely of his own ethnic group. Those in higher status positions were even less disposed to associate themselves with an ethnocentric stance. Of those classed as political leaders in the survey only 3% endorsed the proposition. Directors, lower level leaders, specialists, and white collar workers agreed 4%, 5%, 13% and 14% of the time, respectively, with the proposition.

At the same time, there is a more modern dimension to the sociological phenomenon of ethnic distance that has adverse affects on the extent and bases of trust in interpersonal relationships. Over the last thirty-five years, the proportion of a republic's population which belongs to that republic's dominant nationality has generally decreased. In Slovenia, for instance, 98% of the population of the republic were Slovenes in 1948. That proportion had decreased to 90% in the 1981 census. The same pattern is observable in Serbia proper (SR Serbia minus Kosovo and Vojvodina) and Croatia. It is especially obvious in Montenegro where there has been a steep decrease in the proportion who are ethnically Montenegrin whereas there has been but a slight decrease in the proportion of Macedonians in Macedonia over the last thirty five years.

In Slovenia, in any event, familiarity breeds contempt. What appears to be occurring there is the growth of experientially based, rather than abstract, ethnocentrism. In Slovenia "a much larger proportion of those with higher education than of those with lower levels of education gave relatively high numbers of negative responses" to questions about ethnic distance. This suggests that there is in what is by far the most highly developed republic a "pervasive, far stronger, and more exclusive feeling" among Slovenes which is strongest among the most educated (cf. Burg, 1983, p. 46) and which we may speculate is growing as

Slovenes come into contact with Bosnians, Albanians, and others who increasingly play the role of *gastarbeiter* in Slovenia.

There is another important contemporary dimension to inter-personal trust in Yugoslavia. Whatever the cultural bases of inter-personal trust among Yugoslavs, we would be remiss in an essay on culture and politics if attention were not given the important role of communist rule as an independent variable affecting the levels and bases of inter-personal trust. It was particularly significant in the late 1940s when the Soviet model was being emulated. Especially in the phases of power consolidation and revolutionary breakthrough communist systems have been typically premised on low trust in the citizenry by the political elite. This has usually been translated into a preoccupation with control and fear of spontaneity. The resulting institutionalized mutual suspicion had profound consequences for inter-personal trust.

In this respect Yugoslavia was no exception. The late 1940s were years, as the leading Yugoslav paper, *Politika*, was later to depict them, "When the obtaining of passports depended on janitors' statements" (March 18, 1973). Indeed, the intensity of institutionalized mutual suspicion concomitant with power consolidation and intense political mobilization was initially aggravated in the Yugoslav setting by Stalin's break with Tito. The Yugoslavs, having come to power through Leninist means, used Leninist, indeed Stalinist, means to rebuff Stalin's pressure. The arrest and incarceration of thousands of real and imagined Cominformists (Yugoslavs siding with Stalin and the Communist Information Buro) shaped the attitudes of a generation.

The prize-winning Yugoslav film released in the mid 1980s, "When Father Was Away On Business," captures this reality vividly. It describes the collapse of intra-familial trust in a closely knit Bosnian family in Sarajevo. In the story, the central figure remarks to his mistress that to publish a cartoon in *Politika* that shows Marx sitting at his desk with a picture of Stalin on the wall was going too far. She tells his brother-in-law, the local party secretary, who also covets her. The brother-in-law sees to it that the central figure is charged with harboring Cominformist attitudes. He is sentenced to a corrective labor camp and the brother-in-law gets the girl.

The breakdown in inter-personal trust is exemplified by a scene in which letters are read in the bathroom lest other members of the family know, and by another in which the party secretary is unwilling to aid his sister by arranging for a parcel to be passed on to her incarcerated husband, an act which prompts her to declare that the treatment of communists by communists is worse than that by the *ustashe*, Croatian fascists, in World War II.

The period in which Yugoslav communist elites had enormously adverse effects on inter-personal trust among ordinary Yugoslav citizens was, however, relatively brief. Tito soon realized that the politicization of society with its concomitant impetus toward anomie in inter-personal relations would not be conducive to extended American government or Yugoslav peasant support, and that

he needed both to maximize the prospects of the communist leadership remaining in power. Political decompression followed and the pattern of regime-society relations was dramatically altered. Collectivization efforts--which had actually increased after the June 1948 attack by the Cominform--abated. The efforts to mobilize the society to the political purposes of the regime slackened. Pre-censorship was eliminated, the borders were opened in the early 1960s, and the role of the secret police was reduced, especially after the ouster of Aleksandar Rankovic in 1966. These and other changes in the political system created an environment in which the major sources of inter-personal trust were societal and idiosyncratic rather than political.

Social distance and the carryover of traditional hostility and suspicion of outsiders have their effects on inter-personal trust. At the same time, on an inter-personal level, Yugoslavia is a far more open society than, for instance, the Soviet Union: relative political openness finds its counterpart in a relatively relaxed inter-personal style--which very likely feeds back into a more participant political culture as well.

For foreigners the difference on an inter-personal basis is immediately visible in the ubiquitous *kafanas*. While the statistical yearbooks document what one knows intuitively about the differences in the proportion of beer, wine, and *rakija* consumed in different republics, what is common to (non-Moslem) Yugoslavs is the way they are almost uniformly comfortable about sitting in a cafe, drinking, and talking openly and enthusiastically about politics. It is also manifest in traditional Balkan hospitality; there is still enough of a culture of the poor that it remains really important, especially but not exclusively in the south of Yugoslavia, to be able to lay out a big spread and to demonstrate to the guest through the provision of copious amounts of food just how welcome the guest is (and parenthetically how affluent the hosts are). It is likewise reflected in the far more casual use of the intimate *Ti* rather than the more impersonal *Vi* than in the Soviet Union. Some of the informality in language may stem from the absence of the practice of using first names and patronymics. But it also reflective of a far less status conscious and more informal social system than in the USSR, much in the way that the Balkan-East European culture of hospitality suggests a willingness not to establish markers signifying the existence of social distance once it has been decided to make someone welcome.

Such openness is colored by the political environment and there remain political deterrents, for instance, to contacts with foreigners. Moreover, Yugoslavs are acutely aware of nationality differences that makes for lack of trust across group boundaries. In the absence, however, of the kind of politically induced fear for the consequences of inter-personal contacts of the late 1940s, an impression gained over many years of interacting with Yugoslavs is that at the personal level the openness of their demeanor toward people accepted within a group provides a kind of social solidarity that spills over into political behavior.

Fatalism, authoritarianism and sexism

Ever since the publication of Daniel Lerner's classic study *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1964), it has been well established that fatalism is a characteristic attribute of most traditional societies. In her treatment of the Balkan family in transition, Vera St. Ehrlich (1966, pp. 404-6) argues that with the exception of Slavonia, the flat farming region of what is now SR Croatia, where "love and joy were legitimate and admitted aims," this was true of Yugoslav families in traditional settings.⁶ In both the Dinaric tribal settings and in regions under Ottoman influence, life experiences--choice of spouse, number of children, and for that matter death--were matters of kismet.

Traditional societies were ones in which change was in a fundamental sense illegitimate, even if, as Rihman-Augustin (1984) has shown, the reality of traditional society entailed more role conflict than the conventional wisdom implies. One of the major consequences of the passing of traditional societies is that transitional persons--Lerner's cab drivers in Ankara--are distinguished by their capacity to empathize. They are able to conceive of themselves as occupying other roles and to think about what they would do in such circumstances. Theirs is a world that is subject to change and that can be altered by individual actions. (One should be careful though about overgeneralizing: as St. Ehrlich observes, the Dinaric tribesmen were "fatalists in personal affairs only, not in questions regarding their tribe or the Serbian nation" [1966, p. 405].)

One character of communist takeovers in largely agrarian societies which still retains at least vestiges of the fatalism of traditional society is that the political elite attempts to impose an ideologically grounded optimism in place of the traditionally acquired fatalism. In this respect, Leninist political mobilization and Deutschian social mobilization reinforce each other. In such circumstances, regimes often succeed in literally changing the nature of man in that they undermine the traditional belief in a largely unchanging order.

Ultimately, though, these regimes abandon the heavy reliance on coercion that is typical of the initial phases of rule, as in fact the Yugoslavs did soon after they had digested the implications of the clash with Stalin in 1948. Communist systems that have abandoned the tactics of absolute monopoly over the socialization process and terror as a means of social control and mobilization often find their citizens internalizing some vaguely defined notion of optimism and progress both concerning themselves and concerning society, a notion that the regime reinforces through economic growth.

Personal expectations about the future can then be rather drastically affected by changing circumstances. Although the data are limited and impressionistic, something like this seems to have occurred in Yugoslavia in the 1980s as the society experienced a real decrease in the standard of living for the first time since World War II. Opinion polls in this connection can easily be distorted by context. It is quite difficult to determine whether there have been permanent shifts in basic predispositions toward a more pessimistic outlook concerning the ability of

individuals themselves to affect their lives; but it is clear that confidence in the direct ability of the government to enhance the lives of individuals is diminishing. Moreover, more impressionistic evidence seems to suggest that "the buoyancy, confidence, and self-congratulation of the 1970s are gone" and have been replaced by "strains of pessimism, gloom, resignation, escapism of various kinds, and a feverish creativity associated with what might be called 'apocalypse culture'" (Ramet, 1985, p. 3).

The political consequences of changes in attitude toward the capacity either of individuals or the political system to accomplish change are unclear. One important ingredient in an assessment of the prospects for change, however, concerns the extent to which authoritarian attitudes remain a major component in Yugoslav thought. They certainly exist. Vladimir Arsenek has demonstrated that authoritarian attitudes persist in Slovenia, the most developed and liberal of the republics (as cited in Zupanov, 1983, p. 60).

They are not, though, by any means distributed evenly across the society. As Zupanov notes, "there are indications that [they] are weak in the younger generation" (1983, p. 13). Likewise, striking differences exist across the eight regions and across occupational profiles.

In one survey of Yugoslav youth, teenagers were asked whether they agreed with the proposition that "The most important thing for youth to do is listen to their parents at home, their teachers in school, and their supervisors at work" (*NIN* May 18, 1986, p. 10). The responses showed that with respect to authoritarian attitudes, as in so many other ways, Slovenia and Kosovo are worlds apart. Only 21% percent of the Slovenian youth who were interviewed agreed with the statement while 83% of those from Kosovo responded in the affirmative.

The inverse relationship between level of development and attitudes toward authority generally holds across the remaining six regions as well. A gap separates the Slovenian responses and the remaining responses in much the way that a gap exists between the level of development in Slovenia and in other parts of Yugoslavia. Likewise, a gap analogous to the gap in the level of development between Kosovo and the remainder of Yugoslavia is also observable. Youth from Serbia and Croatia are closest to the Slovenian pattern of responses with 39% and 46% respectively. They are followed by youth from Montenegro (an exception to the overall pattern in which response pattern and regional level of development coincide), with about one-half (49%) agreeing with the proposition and 55% of those from Vojvodina in agreement. Still more inclined to associate themselves with a stereotypically authoritarian posture are youth from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Slightly more than three-fifths (61%) of the Bosnian youth interviewed and almost two-thirds (64%) of the Macedonians endorsed the proposition, numbers that are quite high in comparison with the responses of Slovenian youth but still considerably less than in ethnically Albanian Kosovo.

Another recent survey (*NIN*, May 4, 1986, p. 10) demonstrates the link between class or occupation and authoritarian attitudes. Croats were asked

whether they agreed with the proposition that "People without a leader are like a man without a head"--a nicely designed questionnaire item that links personal and politically relevant authoritarian attitudes. The least disposed to agree with the proposition were those classified as political leaders; only one-third (34%) agreed. Doubtless this should be taken with a grain of salt, in that political leaders are precisely those who should know what the "right" answer is for Yugoslavs ideologically committed to self-management. The interviewers were, however, evidently tapping something substantial in the attitude structure of persons from various classes in Croatia: specialists (57%), lower-level leaders (54%), and directors (62%) were all markedly less disposed to agree with the proposition than were the privately employed (82%), the skilled (85%) and unskilled (88%) workers, and peasants (90%).⁷ Some blend of traditionally based and working class authoritarianism remains an important cultural component for workers and peasants in Croatia. It is a reasonable inference that this proposition generalizes to the bulk of Yugoslavia as well.

One area of Yugoslav life that nicely illustrates the impact of the dramatic changes in Yugoslav society on cultural norms pertains to male-female interactions. In traditional societies in the Balkans women occupied a subservient role in what was largely a patriarchal society. (There were exceptions to this image of reality to be sure, and it was not a situation which women accepted uncritically; nevertheless, especially in the Dinaric regions, the generalization applied.) World War II almost everywhere had enormous effects on women's roles in society. The part women played in the liberation struggle certainly radically changed the position of women in Yugoslavia (Jancar in Ramet 1985, pp. 205 ff.). The communist takeover and the post-war modernization and rapid industrialization furthered the process of destroying traditional patterns by creating norms that amounted to an explicit rejection of the past. The actual changes, especially but not exclusively in the less developed regions, have been considerably more modest than an uncritical acceptance of the slogans would imply; but they do nevertheless constitute a considerable distancing from the traditional culture as well. Women have become increasingly educated and increasingly employed. As in other industrializing societies, however, this has resulted in the development of job categories that are disproportionately occupied by women. Women's work is no longer in the home, but the notion of "women's work" remains. In the directly political sphere, women are found disproportionately in symbolic rather than effective political institutions. For most Yugoslavs, including most women, these facts are not to be highly lamented; most people believe that the norms established during World War II and in the early post-war period are in fact still the norms. Women are in the workplace and are participating actively in politics; such asymmetries between men and women as remain are largely accepted as inevitable.

A minor chord that has been struck in recent years should also be noted, however. In Croatia there are a small number of commentators in the younger generation who have adopted themes that are akin to the feminist literature in the West. For them, industrialization is not seen as having uprooted traditional patriarchalism. Rather, "industrialization has produced a new and perhaps a more virulent form" of patriarchalism (Jancar in Ramet 1985, p. 210) in which women

are used commercially as sex objects and exploited in the workplace. For the relatively few people in Yugoslavia who are associated with this view, both the traditional patriarchal relationship between the sexes and the relations that characterize women and men in contemporary Yugoslavia are evidence of woman's continued exploitation by man.

CULTURE AND POLITICS IN YUGOSLAVIA

In the previous section, we identified several key elements in the Yugoslav culture that bear broadly on an understanding of contemporary Yugoslav political behavior. This section focuses on political culture in the narrower sense employed by Almond and Powell (1965), i.e., orientations to politics.

The structure of political knowledge

How do Yugoslavs think about politics? Yugoslavs have ample opportunity to acquire information about politics. A survey undertaken as part of the Verba, Nie, and Kim cross-national study of political participation and equality (ICPSR, 1978) reveals that about one-third of those surveyed in the republics of Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia read newspapers daily, about three-quarters of them listen to the news on radio, and about four-fifths of them watch the news on television. In all these respects, respondents from Slovenia head the list. There is no clear pattern among respondents from the other three republics. Only slightly more than one-quarter (27%) of those surveyed described themselves as very interested in politics. Respondents from Slovenia are least likely to say they are "very interested."

This lack of interest translates into low levels of knowledge about politics among mass publics. Roughly one-quarter of the respondents were able to identify a then current major proposal by Tito. The same proportion of the sample knew that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was not then in the United Nations and were able to identify Poland as the socialist country where important leadership changes had recently occurred. The remainder either did not know or gave an incorrect answer.

One contributing factor to the lack of knowledge about facts among mass publics pertains to what these same publics--drawing in part from the pre-communist political culture and in part from communist experience--"know" about Yugoslav politics. A 1985 survey conducted by Boris Vuskovic and reported in *NIN* (RFE, March 1, 1985, p. 8) found that 83% of those surveyed agreed that "good connections and acquaintances are the basis for success in life" and two-thirds "thought that good work and knowledge had little or no influence at all." Such attitudes, independent of their empirical basis, are probably not conducive to active mass participation in politics.

In any event, the gap between mass publics and the politically engaged in Yugoslavia is very striking with respect both to interest in politics and to knowledge about politics. The important role of active institutional participation is

quite apparent. Of those active in the Socialist Alliance, 58% said they were very interested in politics. Active participants in the Yugoslav League of Communists (YCL) were even more disposed to be very interested in politics. Of the latter, two-thirds (67%) declared themselves very interested in politics as opposed to slightly more than one-quarter in the overall sample.

The interest in politics among those who are members of the League of Communists finds a parallel in their knowledge about politics. Not surprisingly, they are much more disposed to read newspapers and listen to the news on radio and television. More relevantly, their level of factual knowledge is strikingly higher than that of their ordinary citizen counterparts. Whereas one-quarter of the sample taken as a whole were able to give correct answers to factual questions about politics, approximately half of those who were passive members of the YCL were able to give accurate answers to the three factual questions. Slightly more than half (54%) correctly identified Poland as the socialist country where there had been major changes at the top and (51%) could correctly identify the Tito proposal. Slightly less than half (48%) knew that the PRC was not a member of the United Nations. The proportion of those who were active members of the party who gave correct answers was higher still. About three-fifths (61%) of the politically active members of the party were factually right on the PRC and Poland questions while more than two-thirds (69%) of them correctly described the then current Tito proposal.

A more recent study reveals the same pattern. Of the Slovenes surveyed in 1984, 62% had "heard nothing about the proposals that concluded the 13th session of the Central Committee of the YCL" and only 14% of the remainder could "cite the content of those conclusions" (Sekelj, 1986, p. 126).

Surveys can suggest the gap in levels of interest and knowledge between mass publics and the politically engaged. What they can not do is convey the level of sophistication in the political dialogue that goes on among those seriously interested in Yugoslav political life. A judgment about the overall sophistication of the dialogue between and among elites and the attentive public requires other indicators and must necessarily be rather impressionistic.

These caveats having been duly entered, my reading of the vigorous ongoing dialogue among the politically conscious is that the level of sophistication and intellectual consistency is rather high by international standards. One important factor contributing to this sophistication in tone is that there are many academics and journalists who write quite regularly about developments in Yugoslavia, many of whom have had considerable experience or training in Western Europe and the United States.

Moreover, they and the political elites have a range of vehicles through which they can reach the attentive public or its segments. An image of Yugoslavia that presumes that the party monopolizes the printed media is simply erroneous. Not only are there the major newspapers, of which only *Politika* represents a serious source of an analytic perspective, but a host of other outlets exists as well. A

nonexhaustive but instructive list would include *Start*, a magazine that emulates *Playboy* with respect both to centerfolds and important interviews and articles; the student newspapers of Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana; the weeklies *Danas* and *NIN* that serve as counterparts to *Time* and *Newsweek*; the journals of opinion; and the remarkable plethora of social science journals. Generally, the proposition holds that the broader the audience, the less likely one is to encounter politically sophisticated commentary. Radio, television, and usually the tabloids do not serve as the basis for claims about the relative sophistication and independence of the Yugoslav political dialogue.

For most of the evidence of high-level analysis, one must peruse the specialized journals. These sources describe detailed empirical work and conceptually well-grounded assessments of Yugoslav politics. Survey research on many politically sensitive topics, as readers of this paper will have already noted, is well developed in Yugoslavia. Careful analyses of religious beliefs have been undertaken, notwithstanding the political elite's nominal commitment to atheism. Systematic studies of strikes, their origin and duration, have been conducted, even though strikes are still putatively illegal. (In practice, strikes are illegal in precisely the same way--and occur with much the same regularity--that strikes of public employees including public school teachers are illegal in the state of Michigan.) Solid analytical treatments of inter-regional economic inequality and social distance among members of diverse ethnic groups exist, despite the implications of these studies for the claim by system leaders that a more harmonious and regionally equal country is in the process of being created.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the political sophistication to be found in the specialized media is the appearance there of rigorous content analytic treatments of the mass media. One study, for instance, of the tabloid *Vecernji list* divided the contents of its politically relevant materials into "events in the world" and "events in Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia's relations with the world" and then coded them as to whether they were "apologetically" or "critically" oriented. The treatment of Yugoslavia's relations with the world and events in Yugoslavia was distinctively predictable. Items pertaining to Yugoslavia's foreign policy and the coverage of defense issues were coded as being 99% apologetic; 98% and 96% of the references to Yugoslav science and culture respectively were depicted uncritically; and 84% of the references to events pertaining to internal politics, the economy, and "associated labor" were coded as constituting apologetics (Mance, 1981, p. 1631 citing Lamza; Ramet, 1985, p. 109). By comparison, only half (49%) of the commentary on events in the world constituted apologetics.

We would make less of this as evidence of the sophistication of the political dialogue if the regime segregated this specialized analysis from the attentive public by limiting its appearance to publications with very small press runs. Precisely the opposite happens: the substance of much of the best analysis by Yugoslav scholars is frequently reported by the large-circulation newsweeklies, *NIN* and *Danas*. As a consequence, it is the reader of the equivalent of *Newsweek*, not just the isolated reader of the equivalent of the *American Sociological Review*, who can obtain a picture of important aspects of Yugoslav politics that corresponds with reality.

Substantive cognitions: elite strategies of national cohesion

One can best get a handle on the ways Yugoslav political elites think about politics by assessing the calculus underlying their political and organizational strategy for assuring national cohesion in an ethnically pluralistic society (and in a world of hostile states). That calculus was initially shaped by two crucial events: the successful power seizure during World War II and the success in resisting Stalin's pressures in 1948. In both instances, emulating the Soviet model served the Yugoslav communists well. Out of those experiences many of the partisan generation learned that having an institutionalized Leninist party is the most effective organizational strategy for resisting external influence and for thwarting counter-mobilization domestically. The story of Yugoslav political evolution in the 1950s and 1960s is largely one in which the central political figures--Tito and those around him--fitfully and gradually call the Leninist strategy into question.

Instead, a more conciliatory and consensual strategy toward regime-society relations evolves, exemplified by the introduction of workers' self-management and the symbolically significant act of relabeling the party a league of communists. The defining characteristic of that strategy was that the surest method for maintaining national cohesion was a posture of confidence in the Yugoslav citizenry by the elite. The regime's involvement in society became markedly less intrusive. A conscious political decision was made to restrict the scope of politics. From that time on, even though issues concerning the proper domain of politics remain at the core of political dispute in Yugoslavia to this day, a consensus existed on the minimal proposition that effective governance entails there being some boundaries to the realm of politics. The decision that an effective strategy of national cohesion involves limiting the domain of politics is manifest in a bevy of policies and institutional changes--the virtual abandonment of collectivization as a goal; the elimination of pre-censorship; the toleration of strikes; the gradual acceptance of market socialism in the 1960s; the strengthening of the role of the government, the trade union, and the Socialist Alliance at the expense of the hitherto all-pervasive competence of the party; the movement toward an authentically federal system; and the decision to treat citizen travel abroad as a basically non-political act. By 1970 it appeared that a conclusion had been reached that national cohesion could be best achieved through a consensually based confederative Yugoslavia held together at the top by an assemblage of the best people sharing a common commitment to self-management and non-alignment as national symbols rather than by a Leninist mobilizational strategy.

The events of the early 1970s, most notably the Croatian crisis in 1971, called this consensus into question. One conclusion drawn by many leaders of republics, especially the President of the Serbian party, Marko Nikezic, was that these events demonstrated that it was essential to throw off still more of the Leninist baggage. For Nikezic, the answer to the question, How best to hold Yugoslavia together? was, to employ the headline of an interview he gave the Ljubljana paper *Delo*, "Democratization--Condition of Unity." Nikezic identified himself with an almost social-democratic definition of mass-leadership relations.

Tito reacted otherwise. Tito fell back on the themes from the Leninist political culture that had been muted for more than fifteen years, back to the organizational weapon as the surest institutional strategy for maintaining national cohesion after his death. Once again, he invoked the symbols associated with a Leninist strategy: dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism, cadre policy, control over the mass media. With respect to cognitions about political organization, the case could have been made in the early 1970s that the Yugoslavs had reverted to the Leninist strands in their communist elite political culture. They were replaying the revolutionary heroics of the Partisans who stood together in the war and reinstituting the Leninist party structures that had facilitated their successful resistance to the imperialist machinations of the motherland of socialism herself in 1948.

Writing in the late 1980s, that case seems much weaker both in regard to the strategy of national cohesion that Tito pursued in the last years of his life and to the calculus of his successors. The scope of politics and the domain of the central party organs remained limited. Indeed in many respects the republic party organs were actually strengthened in the 1970s, despite the purges of the Croatian party leadership in 1971 and the Serbian leadership in 1972.

Rather than re-Leninizing either the party or the society, Yugoslav elites have settled on a strategy best characterized as consociational authoritarianism (Zimmerman, 1987, p. 61). "Harmonization" among the six or eight--a key ambiguity--regional organs, and elite consensual decisionmaking rather than conventional Leninist norms remained key ingredients in the central party leadership's conception of a strategy for national cohesion. The other part of that strategy entailed discouraging and even deterring mass participation in politics, thus allowing the members of the "elite cartel" (Lustick, 1979, p. 328) to "enforce with their groups the terms of mutually acceptable compromises." In such a conception, elite pluralism--in the phrase of the leading party theoretician of the Tito years, Edvard Kardelj, "the pluralism of self-managing interests"--was not only legitimate, it was essential for holding the ruling coalition together. Implicit, too, in that conception was the idea that relations among institutional actors would be governed by legal and procedural norms. This was true at the elite and institutional level. It is a more mixed bag with respect to the role of law in regulating the behavior of individuals. In non-political matters, there are many indications of some acceptance of a *rechstaat*. Even in politically inspired cases, there are real defense attorneys. At the same time, though, the belief has prevailed thus far among the leadership that cohesion and social control of citizens are best ensured through both the retention of arbitrary rules prohibiting vaguely defined "hostile propaganda" and a largely non-independent judiciary.

The revealed preferences of the leadership and their implicit strategy of national cohesion have been evidenced repeatedly in the last fifteen years. Politics in Yugoslavia *by design* tends, in Theodore Lowi's terms, to be distributive rather than regulatory or redistributive (Zimmerman, 1987). Consociational authoritarianism as a strategy for national cohesion has been intended to provide an institutional setup in which resource allocations would neither take on the symbolic

coloring and participation of large social movements--nationalities, generations, classes--that one associates with re-distributive politics nor involve the hard choices between winners and losers that is typical of regulatory politics. Instead, it operates on the assumption that the central task in maintaining national cohesion is holding together the ruling coalition by ensuring that the rules of the game for those who count are observed. These rules are symbolic parity for republics; regard for Kosovo as a special case; greater benefits and roles for republics than for autonomous provinces except with respect to development funds for Kosovo; and parity for Croatia and Serbia. More generally, the rules are that all the players that count--the six republic and two provincial party organizations primarily--cut themselves in through some kind of distributive formula such as "six-sixths" or "eight-eighths" or as part of an iterative sequence of decisions through logrolling.

Yugoslav elites believe this maintains peace in the family. It is clear that in a world over which these elites had greater control, this much favored Yugoslav phrase would be their highest priority. Consociational authoritarianism as a strategy for national cohesion creates an environment in which, for instance, domestic and foreign investments are sought for politically attractive, but economically irresponsible purposes. It encourages and rewards an economic policy that implies republic and provincial autarky, and leads to the creation of multiple electronics industries, shipbuilding facilities, airlines, and the like without regard to economies of scale in a country of 22 million people. Yugoslav economists and other social scientists as well are eloquent in condemning such practices but political elites in Yugoslavia have, where possible, shunned economic rationality and the political processes that attend hard choices between winners and losers like the plague. In practice, they much prefer conflict minimizing and economically expensive political formulas and logrolling.

The 1970s and 1980s have not, however, been kind to Yugoslavia. Changes in the international environment and the persisting ramifications of ongoing patterns of uneven demographic and social development have added to problems of the Yugoslav government's own creation to produce an ongoing crisis in Yugoslav political life. Little by way of substantial institutional change has occurred. But what is pertinent here is that recognition of the fact of crisis has produced an outpouring of challenges to what has over the last fifteen years become the elite strategy of national cohesion.

This outpouring involves both challenges to core concepts of how to hold the country together in contemporary circumstances and challenges to basic symbols associated with the deal among political elites on which consociational authoritarianism is premised.

As a result it would be inappropriate to depict even the leadership's substantive cognitions about the most effective way to hold the country together without indicating the wide range of alternatives currently being articulated by very influential people. A view that is expressed largely *sotto voce* is support for a firm hand. More support exists, especially among the young in Serbia proper, for a more centralized system than currently exists that would reduce the power of the

republics and the republic party organs. In place of a strategy of consociational authoritarianism, advocates of this stance would abandon the principle of harmonization as a way of drawing more sharply and narrowly the boundaries demarcating the domain of politics and of allowing freer play for the market. A strong strand in much of the current discussion at the elite level involves the recognition that regime support could be strengthened by increasing citizen participation. Even though someone as liberal in many respects as Dusan Bilandzic, a Zagreb political scientist and LCY central committee member, opposes a competitive multi-party system as threatening to make Yugoslavia the Lebanon of Europe, other people have endorsed greatly increasing the role of the Socialist Alliance as a counterweight to the LCY, while other prominent voices, including a former Secretary of the LCY Executive Committee, Mijalko Todorovic, have publicly justified multi-party systems. "In a multi-party system, there is competition of ideas, personalities, and alternative programs. Consistent political democratization implies political pluralism. After all, there is a difference between the monopoly of power by top people in a one-party system... and the monopoly of power of a party subjected to political competition and changeability" (*Duga*, June 28 and July 11, 1986 cited in RFE, July 17, 1986). His is scarcely the dominant theme in Yugoslavia and certainly not the prevailing view in the YCL. It is noteworthy, though, as evidence of how far removed from the Leninist political culture some strands in elite thinking have evolved in the direction of accepting a truly participant culture.

POLITICAL EVALUATIONS AND AFFECT

Symbolic politics

Given the plethora of views about the ways to hold the country together and the challenge to the elite consensus about the most effective strategy for national cohesion, it should come as little surprise that symbolic politics is a major component of Yugoslav reality.

One whole area of contemporary symbolic politics remains, as it has been for years, culture and the arts: it is still possible in the 1980s--as happened in the 1960s--to produce a stir by engaging in symbolic acts such as publicly declaring that one refuses to receive mail in Serbia written in the Latin script. Of greater political moment is the practice of demonstratively endorsing books or plays that have been condemned in other republics: it is not a rare occurrence these days for a play to be banned in Novi Sad or Sarajevo and to receive a prize in Zagreb or Belgrade. While the motivations for such actions are often complex, one goal often seems to be to italicize the belief that regime-society relations or inter-ethnic relations are more relaxed in one republic than another.

In recent years, however, the most politically significant manifestations of symbolic politics have been evident in acts that imply a fundamental rejection of the system or that threaten parts of the compromise on which consociational authoritarianism is premised.

Thus, the symbol of Tito himself illustrates a manifestation of the former tendency. Some de-Titoization has been taking place in recent years. Slovenian youth have questioned the merit of continuing to observe Tito's birthday in the traditional way, with the subtext being a challenge to the continued relevance of Titoism. A particularly drastic example of manipulating the Tito symbol occurred in 1987 when it transpired that the winning poster announcing the annual Tito celebration had been one used by the Nazis in the 1930s, with doves being substituted for the swastika.

The one area where consociational authoritarianism has been a clear failure is within the Republic of Serbia. The tension over Kosovo raises all the major questions about the ability of Yugoslavia to continue in its current configuration. In addition to disputes over tangible issues, players on all sides of the dispute have engaged in symbolic politics to make a statement that either mobilizes support for one position or denies symbolic gratification to another side.

One could view the whole issue of whether Kosovo should be a republic as symbolic politics. The present situation with Kosovo as an autonomous region is a valiant effort to have it several ways. The current institutional arrangement attempts to provide symbolic gratification to the Albanians as a subculture. Simultaneously, the arrangement reminds all and sundry that a large⁸ non-Slavic population does not have the status of the South Slav nationalities and provides symbolic gratification for the largest nationality, the Serbs. One might hesitate to depict the 1981 riots in Kosovo as symbolic politics (even though the central irritants were slogans such as "Kosovo-Republic" or "K-R" displayed by the Albanians) because the implications of the demands were enormous in their consequences. Many of the acts by the Serbs since 1981, however, have constituted symbolic politics pure and simple. An example of this was the campaign in the early 1980s against the status of the flag of the Albanian nationality, a campaign which even the leadership of Kosovo opposed, imposed largely at the behest of the Serbian leadership and seemingly motivated primarily by an intention to keep the Albanians in their place. On other occasions, the Serbs have attempted to mobilize their own forces by rallies at Kosovo Polje. They have also fostered anti-Albanian feelings by publicizing the alleged efforts of Albanians to drive Serbs and Montenegrins out of Kosovo, and by playing up crimes committed by Albanians against Serbs and Montenegrins.

Yugoslav identity, system and regime support

Symbolic gratification or lack thereof is but one basis for citizen support of the political system or identity with one of the crucial subcultures. While the elite has attached greatest priority to keeping the elite cartel content, major bases for direct, non-diffuse support from Yugoslav citizens are their standard of living and the perpetuation of rights they link to the distinguishing attributes of Yugoslav communism such as the freedom to travel.

Substantial indications exist that the 1980s have taken their toll with regard to citizen support for the regime and its policies. The negative effects on citizen assessments of the government--as well as the openness of the political dialogue--

are apparent. Thus on April 28, 1987, the Yugoslav press agency TANYUG reported that at the Central Committee meeting of the YCL "two speakers openly demanded that the present leadership simply resign" if it fails to overcome the current political and economic crisis. One Central Committee member, Milo Djukanovic, asserted that the leadership should "'give place to the wiser and more capable'" if it fails to deliver (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, EEU, 11, April 30, 1987).

In the less developed regions--which are recipients of the Federation's largesse--interest in joining the party is (still) high among the youth. In a survey reported by *NIN* in 1986 (May 18, p. 10), four-fifths (80%) of the respondents from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 73% of those responding from Kosovo, 63% from Macedonia, and slightly more than half (51%) of the interviewed from Montenegro said they wished to join the party. In contrast, interest ranges from quite low to modest among youthful respondents from the more developed regions. Only 4% of those interviewed from Slovenia said they wished to join the party. Modest interest in joining the party may be found in Croatia (17%) and the more developed parts of SR Serbia--Serbia proper (30%) and Vojvodina (29%).

In Slovenia the disenchantment with the party extends to self-management. Asked their position on the strongly phrased "It's an illusion that self-management will resolve existing social problems," 36% of the young Slovenian respondents agreed. By comparison, in the other seven regions, disillusion, as evidenced by agreement with the proposition, was limited. In Kosovo, 7% agreed as did 16% in Croatia with the remaining regions falling between in predictable proportions (*NIN*, May 18, 1986, p. 10). It would seem that the citizenry generally continue to render token obeisance to the principle of self-management. Of the other obvious major alternatives, Yugoslav publics are far more disposed to look to the Western model for an alternative than to Soviet type systems. According to Mihailo Popovic, only 4% of those he surveyed would prefer a Soviet type economic system, whereas 43% prefer a Western market system and 53% endorse self-management (*NIN*, September 7, 1986).

It appears that in the 1980s specific support for the regime is decreasing. Partly this is a consequence of the worsening economic situation and the resulting overload on the political system. To some extent, too, it is a product of the very strategies of national cohesion entertained by Yugoslav elites. There are several reasons why this is the case. A general failing of communist elites is that they base much of their claim for support from the citizenry on the government's role in achieving economic growth. This has been the situation in Yugoslavia, even under market socialism. The difficulty of course is that hard times are then doubly associated with the political system in the citizens' minds.

In the Yugoslav instance, in addition, the regime encouraged the devolution of political power from the center to the republic party organizations and governments. This has meant in practice that education and many social services have come within the purview of the republics. In Yugoslavia, moreover, it was for a long time the practice to encourage identification with one's ethnic group and to

discourage people from thinking of themselves as Yugoslav. Even in the 1981 census, the instructions to interviewers implied that the right answer to the question concerning the respondent's nationality was one of the Yugoslav nationalities. Provision was made for handling a situation in which the respondent identified himself or herself as a "Yugoslav" but the clear indication was that, while such a response was legitimate, it was not to be elicited (Burg and Berbaum, 1987, p. 8). In combination, these factors have contributed to a situation where, often, as development increased both within and across republics, identification with the republic has also increased.

Paradoxically, symbolic attachment or diffuse support both for Yugoslavia and for other more parochial, to wit republic, and cosmopolitan, to wit pan-Moslem, entities seems to be growing simultaneously.

The evidence for increased attachment to Yugoslavia stems primarily from the great increase in the number of persons calling themselves Yugoslavs in the 1981 census in comparison with the 1971 census. In the 1971 census a mere 1.3% of the population (even fewer proportionately than in the 1961 census) termed themselves Yugoslavs whereas in the 1981 count 5% of the population so described themselves. By far the largest concentration of those calling themselves "Yugoslavs" is to be found in Vojvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia; virtually none is to be found in the regions of Slovenia, Macedonia, and Kosovo where Serbo-Croatian is not the major language.

Moreover, it has been reported that the dramatic increase between 1971 and 1981 has, if anything, accelerated in the years since the latter census (Burg and Berbaum, 1987, p. 27; Bilandzic, 1986, p. 137). According to one survey of Yugoslav youth, the actual rate of Yugoslav identification was "three times that of the 1981 census" and "an astounding frequency of 36% of all youth" would "prefer" to identify as "Yugoslavs" (as cited in Burg and Berbaum, p. 27). This pattern leads Bilandzic to speculate that close to 5 million people (approximately the 1987 population of Croatia) may define themselves as Yugoslavs in the 1991 census (1986, p. 137).

It is difficult to interpret this development. In part it seems to be a kind of protest in the Serbo-Croatian language area against what many regard as the excessive identification of the dominant nationality in a republic with the republic rather than with Yugoslavia. A lot of what is occurring is that those who are not members of the dominant nationality group within a republic increasingly tend to describe themselves as Yugoslavs rather than, in Bosnia, as Serbs or Croats; in Vojvodina, as Croats or Hungarians; and in Croatia, as Serbs. Partly, however, it seems to represent a genuine burgeoning of identification with Yugoslavia which is a product of growing interdependence and contacts across Yugoslavia and a kind of patriotic response to hard times.

What is also occurring, though, in addition to sentiment in Kosovo for amalgamation with Albania, is an intensification of identity on the part of some with either more cosmopolitan or more parochial symbols. At a time when the

number of Moslems in an ethnic and/or religious sense is growing rapidly, there has been some fear, even though Yugoslav Moslems are overwhelmingly Sunnis, that Islam could begin to constitute a danger because of "tendencies within it, which do not shrink from openly and militantly advocating that Marx's science... be replaced by the Islamic religion and the Koranic way of life" (Milan Kangra in Ramet, 1985, p. 174). In Bosnia, pan-Islamic proclivities have been harshly condemned. There, 13 persons were tried and condemned for a number of activities including visiting an Islamic country (almost certainly Iran) for sinister purposes, advocating a religiously pure Bosnia, and contemplating the ultimate creation of Islamistan there (Ramet, 1985, p. 174).

A more widespread phenomenon is the propensity to identify intensely with one's ethnic group. Bilandzic reports an unpublished study by Ivan Siber who concludes that some ten to fifteen percent of the population takes a "nationalist position in the sense of national exclusiveness" (1986, p. 137). He also reports (1986, p. 137), without data, some tendency for persons increasingly to migrate to their 'mother' republic, a phenomenon he describes as one that is a broader development than the outmigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo.

A major manifestation of the increased ethnic attachment to nationality is the apparent resurgence in religious identification. There are wide differences in the proportion of people who consider themselves religious in Yugoslavia. Modernization and urbanization have contributed to secularization in Yugoslavia as elsewhere, even independent of the vigorous efforts by the regime during much of the post World War II period to discredit religion. Religious belief, for instance, remains much stronger in Kosovo than elsewhere. In Kosovo religious belief remains strong even among communists. One survey reported that more than 30% of those who were ethnically Albanian and members of the YCL said that they were religious (NIN, May 25, 1986, p. 19).

In the more developed regions, the propensity for Croats to characterize themselves as religious is much higher than among Serbs, given the institutional strength of the Catholic church. Indeed, in Croatia, some reversal of the trend toward a more secular society seems to be occurring. One study of high school students in the Croatian seaport of Split found that in 1984 52% of those interviewed described themselves as believers whereas the same question asked in 1968 had received an affirmative answer from only 32% of the respondents. A reasonable inference, given the link in the minds of Croats between religion and ethnic identification, is that there has been an increase in Croatian ethnic identification among the young.

Additionally it is worth noting that in at least three republics—Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia—higher education and the disposition to term oneself Yugoslav are negatively correlated. This, as Burg and Berbaum note, is testimony to notions that in these regions at least the devolution of educational responsibility to the republics has contributed to a situation in which university education re-enforces republic not Yugoslav identity. Likewise, even though university training and proclivity to label oneself Yugoslav are positively related for residents of

Kosovo, my assumption is that this is a function of the higher education levels of Serbs in Kosovo. University training in the Albanian language in Pristina was a major factor in explaining the role of students in the 1981 riots. I would be very surprised if identification with Albanian national sentiment is not as strong among those ethnic Albanians with university training from Pristina as it is among other ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING CULTURAL PATTERNS

Since Tito died, a major change has occurred in Yugoslav thinking about non-alignment. Like other first generation revolutionary leaders, Tito had a global foreign policy and used symbolic benefits, which he personally derived from playing the role of global statesman, to avoid paying attention to domestic issues. His successors are more regionally and pragmatically oriented. For them the justification for non-alignment is its efficacy. As Ranko Petkovic, the editor of the major Yugoslav publication *Review of International Affairs*, has written, it has been "the nonaligned countries [which] were the synonym for effectiveness" in recent years (Zimmerman, 1987, p. 40). That is a rationale which would, I believe, meet with little objection among persons in the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. It would certainly be one that the persons I know in the Institute for International Politics and Trade, which is closely linked to the ministry, would endorse. They share in common with Tito the commitment to non-alignment as a symbol acceptable to all members of the domestic coalition and as a policy that enhances the domestic goals of the coalition. As Aleksandar Grlichkov, then an LCY Presidium member, remarked in 1982, the maintenance of a "tolerant political culture of dialogue" within Yugoslavia and nonalignment as a foreign policy are coupled (cited by Irwin in Ramet, 1985, p. 255).

Other than the maintenance of the current status quo, there are three likely domestic scenarios, each of which is readily imaginable, given either the current political culture, or that seem most plausible in light of ongoing demographic and societal changes. These are first, a regime in which the Federation's power is enhanced vis-a-vis the republics' and is therefore more centralized, but in which there is a more thoroughgoing commitment to the market. Such an alternative could live up to the worst fears of Slovenes and Croats and be more repressive than the current one. It could, by contrast, also be commensurate with the values of Serbian liberals and be less repressive than currently. Second would be a strong-hand regime with a strong--Serbian--unitarist strand which might look a lot like Jaruzelski's Poland. The military would presumably play a central role. The third possibility is a regime in which ethnic Moslem influence, mostly from Bosnia-Herzegovina, would be greatly enhanced, probably at the expense of the Slovenes. Very likely, such a regime would be more akin to traditional Leninist systems than is the present one.

While nonalignment would not be abandoned in any of these scenarios, it seems reasonable to expect the content would almost certainly change. A larger Moslem role in the coalition might produce a greater attachment to the global south and to anti-American, anti-colonial policies. A more market-oriented, albeit less

federated, Yugoslavia might be more pro-Western. A military-dominated firm-hand system might be marginally more pro-Soviet. All such tendencies, however, are far more likely within the non-alignment rubric than outside it.

We have seen already in this study harbingers of each of these possibilities. Those who seek the first alternative--greater Federation power at the expense of the republics and more market commitment--have been quite vocal in the last few years as have been their opponents in the Croatian party organization. The prominent Slovene politician, Mitja Ribicic, has publicly worried about the possibility of a rash of strikes being crushed, "If I may say so [in the] Polish manner." Finally, we have witnessed recent attacks on those in Bosnia who seek to create intimate links to the Islamic world (Zimmerman, 1987).

Each of these strands has roots in current Yugoslav elite and mass culture. It is well beyond the scope of this study to predict the most likely evolving scenario. Given an elite political culture which attaches greatest priority to holding together a multinational coalition, what is highly probable is that non-alignment, whatever its variable content, will persist as the Yugoslav foreign policy orientation regardless of the internal political evolution of Yugoslavia.

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Notes

1. I employ the eastern, largely Serbian, variant throughout.
2. This sometimes reflects real resentment and anger. There was an instance in 1986, when a former partisan, a Serb, committed suicide and in his suicide note attacked Slovenian arrogance directed against Balkan peoples.
3. Cf. the exchange of polemics between the Slovenian youth newspaper *Mladina* and *Narodna armija* reported in RFE, March 28, 1985, 15.
4. The 1981 census did not include peasants currently working abroad among those it classified as working in agriculture.
5. In view of the more egalitarian distribution of incomes in both the USSR and Yugoslavia than in the United States and the current attention to economic reform in the Soviet Union, it pays to remember Stalin's famous imprecation that an end must be put to the petit-bourgeois concept of equality.
6. Her thoroughly researched study did not cover Slovenia.
7. White collar workers agreed in 74% of their responses.
8. A frequently told and grisly joke reports an Albanian complaining to a Montenegrin: "Why is it Montenegro has about half a million people and you are a republic while there are way more than a million and a half Albanians and we are not?" To which the Montenegrin replies: "When you are half a million you'll be a republic."

APPENDIX
YUGOSLAV DIVERSITY

Region	I. Population 1981 census (in 000s)	II. Population in agriculture 1981 census (in 000s)	III. 1983 GDP per capita in % of Yugoslav mean	IV. Major Religions	V. Major Languages
Bosnia- Hercegovina	4,124	683	69	Catholic, Orthodox, Moslem	Serbo-Croatian
Croatia	4,601	668	125	Catholic	Serbo-Croatian
Macedonia	1,909	392	65	Orthodox, Moslem	Macedonian
Montenegro	584	76	77	Orthodox	Serbo-Croatian
Slovenia	1,892	173	197	Catholic	Slovenian
S R Serbia:					
Serbia proper	5,695	1,514	99	Orthodox	Serbo-Croatian
Kosovo	1,585	380	28	Moslem, Orthodox	Albanian, Serbo-Croatian
Vojvodina	2,035	391	121	Orthodox, Catholic	Serbo-Croatian, Magyar
Yugoslavia	22,425	4,277			

A NOTE ON THE AUTHOR

William Zimmerman received his B.A. degree from Swarthmore (1958), M.A. from George Washington (1959), and Ph.D. from Columbia (1965). He joined the faculty of The University of Michigan in 1963 and has been Professor of Political Science since 1974. He has served as Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies and as Associate Dean for the Faculty, College of Literature, Science, and the Arts.

Professor Zimmerman has resided and traveled widely in Eastern Europe, including the USSR and Yugoslavia; he served as a Fulbright-Hays scholar in the latter country in 1970 and has returned several times for shorter visits. He has been awarded numerous fellowships, grants, and awards, including the Helen Dwight Reid and Pi Sigma Alpha awards of the American Political Science Association. He is the author of several books on Soviet, Yugoslav, and international politics, including Open Borders, Non-alignment and the Political Development of Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeton University Press), as well as numerous chapters and articles. His current projects involve interviewing emigrants from the Soviet Union and strategic studies.